REVERSE PAYMENTS: WHEN THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION CAN
ATTACK THE VALIDITY OF
UNDERLYING PATENTS
INTRODUCTION
Settlements between brand-name and generic pharmaceutical
companies that delay generic entry into the market are estimated to
cost American consumers $35 billion over the next ten years. 1 With
spiraling healthcare costs and an aging population, the public deserves
an explanation for the inordinate amount drug companies pay one
another to stay off the market because the effects of this egregious
conduct are ultimately passed on to them. In recent years, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) has sought to protect consumers from these
dubious payments by arguing they violate antitrust law but to no
avail. 2
These questionable agreements typically arise from patent infringement cases between a brand-name pharmaceutical company and
a generic drug producer. Under the provisions of the Hatch-Waxman
Act, a generic company can allege a brand-name’s patent is invalid or
will not be infringed upon by the generic’s new drug when it seeks

1

FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS
COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 2 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/
100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.
2
See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065-66 (11th
Cir. 2005) (The FTC argued the “reverse payments” were an illegal restraint of trade
in violation of antitrust law. The court, however, found that neither the rule of reason
or per se analysis was applicable, noting “both approaches [are] ill-suited for an antitrust analysis of patent cases because they seek to determine whether the challenged
conduct had an anticompetitive effect on the market…. By their nature, patents can
create an environment of exclusion, and consequently, cripple competition.”); In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(upholding the district court’s finding that the agreement was not per se illegal and
acknowledging that these types of agreements are within the patentee’s rights); In re
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that
settlements to protect the patent monopoly, without more, does not establish an antitrust violation).

37

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET [Vol. 2:1

38

approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 3 But prior to
an FDA review of the generic’s application, a brand-name can elect to
sue the generic if it believes the generic will infringe upon its own
patent. 4 To avoid the cost of litigation, parties usually settle; however,
it is the patent holder, not the alleged infringer, who ultimately pays to
settle. This practice is commonly known as providing a “reverse payment,” because the alleged infringer who normally pays to settle a
case is being paid by the patent holder instead. In these agreements,
the patent holder pays the generic ostensibly for the generic’s promise
not to enter the market in order to protect its monopoly in the market.5
These agreements are particularly problematic because the disputed
patents may actually be invalid, an issue that is never debated, since a
settlement is often reached prior to trial. This fear increases when one
considers that from 1992 to 2002, generics prevailed in 73% of the
patent infringement cases that were resolved by a court decision.6
Because the frequency of these settlements continues to steadily increase it is imperative to consider the legality of this behavior in order
to protect those most affected by this–the consumers. 7
In reviewing the most recent decisions involving “reverse payments,” where these settlements have been increasingly upheld, the
need for the FTC to change its tactics becomes evident. Legal commentators, though, have struggled to develop a better alternative to
using antitrust laws to combat this practice. This Note proposes that
the FTC stop working within the traditional antitrust framework and
force the pharmaceutical companies to justify that these agreements
3

See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
(Hatch-Waxman Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat 1585 (1984) (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (West 2010)).
4
Id.
5
See In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 988 (2003) (“If there has
been a payment from the patent holder to the generic challenger, there must have been
some offsetting consideration. Absent proof of other offsetting consideration, it is
logical to conclude that the quid pro quo for the payment was an agreement by the
generic to defer entry beyond the date that represents an otherwise reasonable litigation compromise.”).
6
FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 8 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/
genericdrugstudy.pdf.
7
See BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FTC, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG,
IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS FILED
IN FY 2008 8 fig.3 (2010) [hereinafter FTC SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100113mpdim2003rpt.pdf (summarizing settlements
filed with the FTC and revealing a steady increase from zero settlements restricting
generic entry and compensation the generic in 2004 to sixteen settlements of this
nature in 2008).
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are within the scope of its patent rights. Specifically, this Note argues
that the FTC has standing to challenge the validity of the underlying
patent and should challenge the brand-name’s patent when it charges
these companies with antitrust violations. The Supreme Court has
long recognized that the Government has a duty to protect the public
from anticompetitive behavior and has extended this duty by allowing
the Government to challenge a patent when the patent holder was
charged with violating antitrust law.8 Based upon this precedent and
considering that the FTC’s Competition Bureau is the government
agency that currently investigates antitrust violations in the pharmaceutical industry, 9 the FTC should have the ability to challenge patents involved in these settlements.
Part I provides a background of Hatch-Waxman Act. Part II provides an introduction to the basic approaches to antitrust violations:
the per se and rule of reason analyses. Part III discusses various approaches taken by the courts in recent years when dealing with “reverse payments,” while part IV provides an overview of the current
academic debate about these settlements. Part V discusses case law
that supports the conclusion that the Government has the standing to
challenge the underlying patent involved in these suspect settlements
and details how this power can be an effective tool in preventing abusive pharmaceutical settlements.
Ultimately, this Note offers a novel approach for the FTC to use
in its fight against “reverse payments.” By sidestepping the debate
over how these payments should be treated (i.e., per se illegal or reasonable under the rule of reason), the FTC can avoid current judicial
opinion and does not have to wait for Congress to enact legislation
prohibiting these payments. Instead, the FTC can ensure these agreements do not abuse the exclusionary scope of the patent by forcing the
pharmaceutical companies to prove their patents are valid.

8

See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 388 (1948)
(“In a suit to vindicate the public interest by enjoining violations of the Sherman Act,
the United States should have the…opportunity to show that the asserted shield of
patentability does not exist.”); United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 57-58
(1973) (finding the Government has authority to “raise and litigate the validity
of…patents in [an] antitrust case.”).
9
See generally Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust
Implications of Patent Settlements: Hearing Before the S. Comm on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. (2001) (statement of James M. Griffin, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.
Antitrust Division) (describing the shared responsibility of the Department of Justice
and Federal Trade Commission to investigate “reverse payment” agreements).
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I. REGULATORY BACKGROUND: SUMMARY OF THE
HATCH -WAXMAN ACT AND AMENDMENTS
In 1984, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition & Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly known as the HatchWaxman Act. 10 The idea behind the Act was to make the pharmaceutical market more competitive by facilitating the ability of generics to
enter the market, in particular by changing the FDA approval requirements for generics.11 Prior to 1984, every single drug company
who wanted to release a new drug, brand-name or generic, had to file
a new drug application (“NDA”). 12 An NDA requires each applicant
to submit safety and efficacy studies, list the components of the drug,
describe the methods used in manufacturing the drug and the
“processing and packaging” of the drug, and disclose any patents issued relating to the drug. 13 Thus, prior to 1984, generics had to submit
their own safety and efficacy studies even if similar studies had been
performed for drugs comprised of the same ingredients. 14 However, a
generic could not even begin performing drug trials until after the
relevant patent on the brand-name drug had expired or it risked being
sued for patent infringement by a brand-name. 15 This effectively extended the life of the original pharmaceutical patent beyond its term.
Therefore in order to facilitate access to the drug market, the HatchWaxman Act created an abbreviated new drug application
(“ANDA”). 16 This application differs from the traditional NDA because it allows the generics to take advantage of prior safety and efficacy studies conducted so long as the manufacturer can prove that the
10

Pub. L. No 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.A. §
355 (West 2010)).
11
See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt.1, at 14-15 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647-48.
12
See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 190-92 (2d Cir.
2006) (explaining the NDA process and the availability of the ANDA post-1984 to
facilitate generic market entry); see also Erica N. Andersen, Schering the Market:
Analyzing the Debate Over Reverse-Payment Settlements in the Wake of the Medicare
Modernization Act of 2003 and In re Tamoxifen Citrate Litigation, 93 IOWA L. REV.
1015, 1018-19 (2008). Today, brand-name companies making an initial market entry
still have to file an NDA under 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
13
§ 355(b)(1) (requirements of an NDA).
14
See Schering Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 n.2 (11th Cir.
2005) (describing the purpose and effect of the addition of the ANDA to the HatchWaxman Act).
15
Prior to 1984, the generic may have been liable under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)
(2006); however, the Hatch-Waxman Act created a safe-harbor provision for this
practice in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006). See Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 195-96 (2005).
16
21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j) (West 2010).
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generic is bio-equivalent to the brand-name. 17 Additionally, the Act
amended what constitutes patent infringement in order to allow safety
and efficacy testing of generics before the expiration of the brandname drug patent. 18
Under the Act, an ANDA filer must certify that to the best of its
knowledge that the generic does not infringe on any patent listed with
the FDA. 19 The filer can assert: (1) the “patent information has not
been filed” on the generic’s bio-equivalent (Paragraph I certification);
(2) a “patent [on a bio-equivalent] has expired” (Paragraph II certification); (3) a patent exists however the generic will not market the
drug until after the date “such patent will expire” (Paragraph III certification); or (4) “such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the new [generic] drug for which the application is submitted” (Paragraph IV certification).20 If the generic
filing the ANDA makes a Paragraph IV certification, it is required to
notify each NDA holder or patent holder affected by its ANDA certification within twenty days of filing, at which point the brand-name
drug company has forty-five days to decide if it wants to sue for infringement. 21 If the NDA or patent holder decides to file suit, then an
automatic thirty-month stay goes into effect during which the FDA is
not allowed to approve the generic unless a court determines the patent is invalid or not infringed before the stay ends. 22 To compensate
for the delay in FDA approval, the first entity to file an ANDA application is automatically entitled to a 180-day period of exclusivity. 23
This period begins after the first commercial marketing of the drug,
during which the FDA agrees not to approve any subsequent ANDA
applications. 24

17
Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1058-59 n.2 (“The Hatch-Waxman’s
truncated procedure avoids the duplication of expensive safety and efficacy studies,
so long as the generic manufacturer proves that the drug is bio-equivalent to the already-approved brand-name/pioneer drug.”).
18
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (safe harbor provision).
19
21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii).
20
§ 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii)(I-IV).
21
§ 355(j)(2)(B) (notice requirements); § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (timeline for filing
an infringement action).
22
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
23
§ 355 (j)(5)(B)(iv).
24
See id. (indicating that the exclusivity period only applies to the “first
applicant” after the “first commercial marketing of the drug”); see also Michael A.
Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive Illegality,
108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 47 n.62 (2009) (discussing how prior to 2003 the HatchWaxman Act contained a “second trigger” for the exclusivity period with a final court
decision).
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Concerned with abuses stemming from the original HatchWaxman Act, Congress enacted the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (Medicare Act). 25 For
example prior to the revision, a brand-name drug company, in theory,
could obtain an unlimited number of thirty-month stays. A brandname would obtain these multiple stays by first listing other patents
relating to its drug with the FDA after the generic filed its ANDA.
Once its first thirty-month stay ended, the brand-name would allege
the generic potentially infringed one of these newly listed patents,
allowing the brand-name to enjoy another thirty-month stay. Using
this strategy, GlaxoSmithKline was able to prevent generic companies
from competing against its antidepressant drug Paxil for more than
five years. 26 Congress addressed this issue in the Medicare Act by
limiting thirty-month stays to patents on file with the FDA before the
ANDA was submitted. 27
The Medicare Act also sought to curb the abuse of the 180-day
exclusivity period by ensuring that a generic company who was
granted the period either used it or was forced to forfeit it. 28 For example, a generic would be forced to forfeit the exclusivity period if it:
(1) failed to market the drug within seventy-five days of FDA approval; (2) failed to market the drug within seventy-five days of a final
judgment finding the patent invalid or not infringed; (3) withdrew its
application; (4) failed to obtain tentative FDA approval within thirty
months after the application was initially filed; or (5) entered an
agreement with another applicant or patent holder that violated antitrust laws. 29 This amendment was designed to prevent the bottlenecks
that could occur if the first filer of an ANDA took actions to avoid
triggering its exclusivity period, which would prevent other generics
from entering the market until the first-filing generic’s exclusivity
period expired. 30
Finally, the amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act also required
the patent holder and first paragraph VI ANDA filer who reach a settlement during litigation to file the agreement with the FTC and the
25

Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 21, 26, and 42 U.S.C.).
26
See Carrier, supra note 24, at 47-48 (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC
DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 51 (2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf).
27
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); see Carrier, supra note 24, at 48.
28
See § 355(j)(5)(D); see also Carrier, supra note 24, at 48 (discussing the
various forfeiture events provided by the statute to curb the abuse of the 180 day
exclusivity period).
29
Carrier, supra note 24, at 48 (citing § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)).
30
Id. at 49.
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DOJ within ten days of entering into the agreement.31 Arguably, this
requirement would make it easier for the FTC and DOJ to review the
agreements to verify they did not violate antitrust law. 32

II. APPROACHES TO ANTITRUST LAW
While a patent allows its holder to “exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention,” 33 the Government
and private entities argue that “reverse payments” between pharmaceutical companies go beyond the scope of a patent and are illegal
restraints of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.34 The Sherman Act
states that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 35 The
Supreme Court has interpreted this prohibition as only applying to
unreasonable restraints of trade.36 In determining whether there is an
unreasonable restraint of trade, courts will apply either the per se rule
or the rule of reason analysis. 37 Despite the existence of two approaches, courts generally apply the rule of reason analysis, 38 reserving the per se rule for agreements that have a “predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect, and such limited potential for precompetitive benefit.” 39
To find an agreement per se illegal, a court must have adequate
experience with the conduct described and be able to find it yields
anticompetitive effects in almost every instance.40 If a court deter-

31

§ 355 (j)(5)(D)(i)(V); see also Carrier, supra note 24, at 48.
See Carrier, supra note 24, at 48 (discussing how the Hatch-Waxman Act
was designed to prevent secret agreements and how the Medicare Act amendments
sought to support this objective through required disclosure).
33
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
34
See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005);
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In
re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006).
35
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
36
See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“Although the Sherman
Act, by its terms, prohibits every agreement ‘in restraint of trade,’ this Court has long
recognized that Congress intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints.”) (citation
omitted).
37
Id.
38
Id.; see also Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (noting that the
rule of reason “presumptively applies”).
39
State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 10.
40
Id. (“Per se treatment is appropriate ‘[o]nce experience with a particular
kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason
will condemn it.’” (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332,
32
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mines that the disputed conduct is per se illegal, it can simply condemn the restraint of trade without an inquiry into the defendant’s
market power, the actual anticompetitive effects of the conduct, or the
reasons for the conduct. 41 The Supreme Court, however, has expressed concerns over applying the per se analysis, since it “require[s]
the Court to make broad generalizations about the social utility of
particular commercial practices.”42 If there are too many per se violations, there is a risk that the law will become too rigid and prevent
courts from considering the facts in future cases. 43 Therefore, the per
se rule generally applies only to a few types of conduct, such as price
fixing, tying agreements, and “naked” exit payments (made only to
keep a potential competitor from entering the market). 44
If a court is unable to find such pernicious conduct, it instead applies the rule of reason analysis.45 Under the rule of reason, “the finder of fact must decide whether the questioned practice imposes an
unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of
factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.” 46 The plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating that the defendants have “market power” in a
particular market and that their alleged conduct produced adverse,
anticompetitive effects within the relevant market. 47 If the plaintiff is
able to demonstrate such effects, the burden shifts to the defendant to
justify the conduct by explaining how it is pro-competitive. 48 If the
344 (1982)); see also In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., No. 01-1652, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11756, at *52 (D. N.J. Feb. 4, 2009).
41
In re K-Dur, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11756, at *52; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Sensible Antitrust Rules for Pharmaceutical Competition, 39 U.S.F. L. REV.
11, 20 (2004) (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984)).
42
Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977).
43
Id. (“Once established, per se rules tend to provide guidance to the business community and to minimize the burdens on litigants and the judicial system…,
but those advantages are not sufficient in themselves to justify the creation of per se
rules. If it were otherwise, all of antitrust law would be reduced to per se rules, thus
introducing an unintended and undesirable rigidity in the law.”).
44
See State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 11 (price fixing as per se illegal); NCAA,
468 U.S. at 100 (“Horizontal price fixing and output limitation are ordinarily condemned as a matter of law under an ‘illegal per se’ approach because the probability
that these practices are anticompetitive is so high….”); Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at
20 (discussing the illegality of price fixing, tying agreements, and exit payments).
45
See State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 10.
46
Id.
47
United States v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2003).
48
Id. For instance, a pro-competitive justification may include benefits the
consumers by reducing marginal costs or increased efficiency of production. See
Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law? 42 U.C. DAVIS
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defendant is able to provide a reasonable explanation for its conduct,
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate either that the
objectives of the conduct can be achieved in a less restrictive manner
or that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve the procompetitive objectives. 49 Essentially, the rule of reason analysis asks
the trier of fact to weigh the harms and benefits of the challenged
conduct to determine if it broadly promotes or hurts competition. 50
In relation to pharmaceutical settlements, courts have applied both
the per se and the rule of reason analysis. 51 The disagreement among
courts and commentators on how to treat these settlements stems from
the tension between antitrust and patent law. Patents are designed to
grant the holder a legal monopoly, which seems in direct conflict with
the goals of antitrust law, but a patent monopoly is not absolute. Thus,
the courts must decide whether these settlements are a legal exercise
of the rights granted by a patent or if they go beyond this scope.

III. SUMMARY OF RECENT PHARMACEUTICAL
ANTITRUST CASES
Recently, there has been an influx of antitrust cases filed against
brand-name pharmaceutical companies and generics over patent settlements, which according to the FTC and consumer groups should be
considered illegal restraints of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 52 Initially, the courts were more receptive to the arguments arti-

L. REV. 1375, 1385 (2009). However, “[a] restraint on competition cannot be justified
solely on the basis of social welfare concerns.” Schering-Plough, Corp. v. FTC, 402
F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005).
49
Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d at 238.
50
Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d
537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,
238 (1918) (“The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition.”)).
51
See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d
1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (upholding the district court’s decision the agreement
was legal under the rule of reason analysis); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig. (Cardizem CD III), 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003) (ruling the agreement was per se
illegal).
52
See, e.g., See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1061 (11th
Cir. 2005) (FTC argued that that the ESI agreement violated Section 1 of the Sherman
Act); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride, 544 F.3d at 1340 (holding that the settlement agreements did not violate the Sherman Act and that all anticompetitive effects
were within the exclusionary power of the ‘444 patent); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 190 (2d Cir. 2006) (plaintiffs argued that the settlement was
an agreement to monopolize the market for Tamoxifen).
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culated by the FTC and consumer groups, but courts have increasingly
ruled in favor of these agreements. 53
A. In re Cardizem
In the first case ruling against “reverse payments,” In re Cardizem, the Sixth Circuit determined that the agreement between Hoescht
Marion Rouseel, Inc. (HMR) and Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was
per se illegal under the Sherman Act. 54 HMR manufactured Cardizem
CD, a drug used to treat angina and to prevent heart attacks and
strokes, under a license granted by Carderm Capital, the patent holder. 55 In 1996, HMR, in conjunction with Carderm, filed suit against
Andrx, claiming its generic would infringe upon Carderm’s new patent, which covered the drug’s method of release in the body. 56 The
two parties came to an agreement in 1997, after the FDA had tentatively approved Andrx’ ANDA. 57 The approval would have allowed
Andrx to enter the market once the court ruled that Carderm’s patent
was not infringed or the thirty-month waiting period had elapsed.58 In
exchange for delaying the release of Andrx’s generic until a determination on infringement, HMR agreed to pay $40 million a year. 59 If
Andrx received final FDA approval, the payment would increase to
$100 million if it was determined the patent was not infringed.60 Additionally, Andrx agreed to prosecute its ANDA, securing its 180-day
period of exclusivity granted by the Hatch-Waxman Act. 61
In July 1998, the FDA issued its final approval of Andrx’s
ANDA, which prompted HMR to increase its payments to Andrx (as
provided in the agreement) to prevent its entry into the market. 62
Meanwhile, in hopes of avoiding further litigation, Andrx amended its
ANDA to seek approval for a reformulated version, which it thought
53

See discussion infra.
Cardizem CD III, 332 F.3d at 908 (“There is simply no escaping the conclusion that the Agreement…was, at its core, a horizontal agreement to eliminate
competition in the market for Cardizem CD throughout the entire United States, a
classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.”).
55
Id. at 901-02.
56
Id. at 902.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 903.
61
Id. at 902. This strategy is no longer permissible under the Hatch-Waxman
Act, which provides that a company cannot hold onto its 180-day exclusivity period if
it fails to market the drug within a specified time period after final FDA approval. See
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i) (2006); Carrier, supra note 24, at 48-49.
62
Id.
54
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did not infringe Carderm’s patent. 63 The FDA approved the new version in 1999 and the two parties decided to end their agreement and
settle the infringement case. 64 In total, HMR paid Andrx $89.83 million ($50.7 final settlement payment plus prior payments under the
agreement) after which, Andrx began to market its generic and, not
surprisingly, obtained a substantial share of the market. 65
Ignoring the argument that the arrangement was within HMR’s
rights as the patent holder, the court ruled the agreement was per se
illegal. 66 Because HMR paid its only known potential competitor to
stay off the market, the court found the agreement was analogous to a
“horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the market,” which
is always treated as per se illegal. 67 This conclusion was supported by
the fact the agreement delayed the entry of other generics into the
market since Andrx possessed the 180-day exclusivity period granted
to the first generic to file an ANDA. 68 The court noted that it is one
thing to use the legal monopoly granted by the patent, but it is another
to silence all potential competitors by “paying the only potential competitor $40 million per year to stay out of the market.” 69 Therefore,
despite the traditional patent rights granted to the holder, the court
ruled that this agreement was a per se illegal restraint of trade.
B. Valley Drug/Schering-Plough
In Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals Inc., the first major case in the Eleventh Circuit concerning “reverse payments,” the
court refused to follow the Sixth Circuit and rule “reverse payment”
agreements were per se illegal. 70 Instead, the court noted that “reverse
payments” may be a permissible exercise of the patent holder’s rights
and thus, they cannot be held to the per se illegal standard.71 At issue
were agreements made between Abbott Laboratories and two generic
companies that prevented the generics from entering the market.
63

Id.
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 908.
67
Id.; see United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (describing how “horizontal territorial agreements” cannot have pro-competitive objectives).
68
See Cardizem CD III, 332 F.3d at 907. The agreement by Andrx to continue to seek its ANDA effectively meant that other generics could not enter the market
until the 180 days expired. Id.
69
Id. at 908.
70
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F. 3d 1294, 1310-11 (11th
Cir. 2003).
71
Id.
64
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Abbott manufactures Hytrin (active ingredient: dihydrate terazosin hydrochloride), which is used to treat hypertension and enlarged
prostate. 72 Originally, Abbott held a patent on the major chemical
compound in the drug, but it subsequently obtained patents covering
different forms and uses of the drug. 73 From 1993-1996, Geneva filed
six ANDAs based on Hytrin, each time making paragraph IV certifications with respect to the listed patents. 74 During the same time period, Zenith also filed an ANDA, making a paragraph IV certification
to Abbott’s Hytrin patent. 75 As a result, Abbott filed an infringement
suit against both Geneva and Zenith.
In 1998, Abbott and Zenith entered into an agreement, where Abbott agreed to pay Zenith $3 million up front, $3 million after three
months, and $6 million every three months until March 1, 2000 or
until the agreement terminated for another reason.76 In exchange, Zenith agreed not to sell or transfer its rights under any ANDA relating
to a terzosin hydrochloride drug. Zenith also agreed not to aid anyone
in gaining FDA approval for such drug or to aid anyone in opposing
or invalidating Abbott’s patents relating to Hytrin. Lastly, Zenith
agreed not to sell or distribute any drug containing terazosin hydrochloride until Abbott’s patent expired or another generic introduced a
drug containing the compound. 77
In 1998, Abbott and Geneva entered into a similar agreement,
where Geneva could not sell or distribute any “pharmaceutical product” containing terazosin hydrochloride until Abbott’s patent expired,
another company introduced a generic form, or Geneva was successful in demonstrating that its product did not infringe Abbott’s patents
or proving Abbott’s patent was invalid.78 In return, Abbott agreed to
pay Geneva $4.5 million each month until another company introduced a generic form of terazosin hydrochloride or Abbott won a favorable result the infringement claim against Geneva. 79
Several various private drug companies sued Abbott, Geneva and
Zenith, asserting that the settlement agreements violated antitrust
laws. 80 The District Court ruled that the agreements were per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act and granted partial summary judg72

Id. at 1298.
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 1299.
76
Id. at 1300.
77
Id. (detailing the settlement agreement between Abbott and Zenith).
78
Id. Geneva also agreed as part of the settlement to not sell or transfer its
rights under its ANDA. Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 1301; see 15 U.S.C. §1 (2006).
73
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ments to the plaintiffs.81 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed,
finding that the agreements were not per se illegal because one of the
parties owned a patent. 82 Since a patent grants the holder a legal monopoly, creating a settlement excluding generics from the market was
considered within the patent holder’s rights.83 Although the size of the
settlement payment did cast suspicion on the patent’s validity, the
court would not conclude simply from the size of the payment that the
agreement was made in bad faith.84 The Eleventh Circuit refused to
follow the Sixth Circuit in finding these payments were per se illegal
because in its opinion the Sixth Circuit failed to adequately consider
the “exclusionary power of the patent.” 85
In Schering-Plough v. FTC, the Eleventh Circuit went even further to describe its stance on “reverse payments,” arguing that neither
the rule of reason nor per se analysis is appropriate when deciding if
such payments violate antitrust law. 86 In 2001, the FTC filed a complaint alleging that the settlements between Schering-Plough and two
generic manufacturers, Upsher-Smith and Schering-Plough and ESI
Lederle, Inc. (ESI), violated antitrust law. 87
Upsher-Smith had filed with the FDA to gain approval on its generic version of Schering-Plough’s K-Dur 20, a supplement taken in
conjunction with other prescriptions for the treatment of high blood
pressure or congestive heart disease. 88 During the patent infringement
action, Schering-Plough and Upsher-Smith reached a settlement
where Schering-Plough agreed to license other Upsher products in
exchange for Upsher agreeing to delay its entry into the market until
September 2001. 89 Similarly, ESI sought FDA approval of its own
generic version of K-Dur 20, which prompted Schering-Plough to file
an infringement suit. 90 As part of the settlement, Schering-Plough
agreed to pay ESI $5 million for legal fees, to allow ESI to enter the
81

See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1340,
1354 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
82
Valley Drug Co., 344 F. 3d at 1306.
83
Id. at 1304-05 (describing the scope of the patent holder’s rights and the
inherent market effect of such rights).
84
Id. at 1309-10. The court did not know what factors, such as lost profits
expected from generic competition, the generics’ expected profits, or expected savings in litigation costs, went into determining the size of the payment. Without this
knowledge, the court could not conclude that the size of the payment reflected the
patentee’s belief that the patent was invalid. Id.
85
Id.
86
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005).
87
Id. at 1061.
88
Id. at 1058.
89
Id. at 1059.
90
Id. at 1060.
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market three years before its patent expired, and to pay an additional
$10 million if the FDA approved ESI’s application. 91 In exchange,
ESI agreed to remain off the market and granted Schering-Plough
licenses on its own drug patents. 92
Subsequently, the FTC filed an administrative complaint against
all three companies, alleging that the settlements violated Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) and Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 93 After an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found these
settlements to be lawful, the FTC appealed to the full Commission. 94
The Commission overruled the ALJ, finding the payments to be illegal because “the quid pro quo for the payment was an agreement to
defer the entry dates, and…such delay would injure competition and
consumers.” 95 The Eleventh Circuit reversed the Commission, finding
that there was not enough evidence to support the conclusion that the
settlements violated the Sherman and FTC Acts.96 In doing so, however, it rejected both the per se and rule of reason analysis typically
applied in antitrust cases, finding that both approaches were ill-suited
to determine the antitrust liabilities of a patent holder. 97 It noted that
because of “their nature, patents create an environment of exclusions,
and consequently, cripple competition” and thus, an “anticompetitive
effect is already present.” 98 The court proposed to determine antitrust
liability by examining: “(1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of
the patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed that scope;
and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects.” 99 Applying its own
standard, the court found that the agreements did not exceed the scope
of that patent and the anticompetitive effects of the settlement were
far outweighed by the benefits, especially considering the potential
negative effects caustic patent litigation may have on innovation. 100
C. In re Tamoxifen
In In re Tamoxifen, the Second Circuit considered a “reverse
payment” settlement between Zeneca and Barr, involving the drug
91

Id. at 1060-61.
Id. at 1061.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 1062.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 1071-72.
97
Id. at 1065.
98
Id. at 1065-66.
99
Id. at 1066 (citing Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm. Inc., 344 F. 3d 1294,
1312 (11th Cir. 2003)).
100
See id. at 1075.
92
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tamoxifen, which is the most prescribed breast cancer drug. 101 Unlike
prior cases, the district court had already invalidated the tamoxifen
patent before the two parties reached an agreement.102 However, because the judgment was never affirmed, the Second Circuit did not
speculate as to the ultimate resolution of the issue and it declined to
consider the district court’s finding of invalidity as part of its analysis. 103 The court ultimately found that the agreements were not per se
illegal and were, in fact, legal.104
Immediately after the United States Patent & Trademark Office
(USPTO) issued the patent in 1985 to Imperial Chemical Industries,
PLC, (“ICI”), Barr filed an ANDA with the FDA based on its generic
version of tamoxifen.105 Barr amended its application in 1987 to include a paragraph IV certification, which prompted ICI to file an infringement suit against Barr and its raw material supplier.106 At trial,
the district court invalidated ICI’s patent because the company withheld crucial information from the USPTO during patent prosecution. 107 The decision was appealed but before the appeal was considered, the two sides agreed to settle.
The agreement restricted Barr from marketing its generic until after the expiration of Zeneca’s patent in 2002 and required Barr to
amend its ANDA to a Paragraph III certification in exchange for $21
million and a non-exclusive license to market Zeneca-manufactured
tamoxifen under its own label.108 Additionally, if Zeneca’s patent was
invalidated, Barr would be allowed to revert its ANDA certification to
a Paragraph IV certification. 109 Pursuant to the settlement, the parties
moved to vacate the district court’s judgment, which was granted by
101

In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 202.
103
Id. at 204-05.
104
Id. at 206. In so holding, the Second Circuit considered Valley Drug Co. v.
Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F. 3d 1294, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003), where the Eleventh
Circuit found the mere existence of a reverse payment is not enough to assert an antitrust violation and Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994
(N.D. Ill. 2003), where the court argued that banning reverse payments would disincentive a patent challenger by limiting settlement options.
105
In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F.3d at 193. Zeneca is a former subsidiary of
ICI, which succeeded to the rights of the tamoxifen patent.
106
Id.
107
Id. (ICI withheld tests that revealed opposite desired hormonal effects than
those “sought in humans,” which could have “unpredictable and at times disastrous
consequences.” (citing Imperial Chem. Indus., PLC v. Barr Labs., 795 F.Supp. 619,
622 (S.D.N.Y 1992)).
108
Id. at 193-94. Barr’s raw material supplier was also paid $9.5 million
upfront and $35.9 million over the course of ten years. Id. at 194.
109
Id. at 194.
102
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the Federal Circuit.110 Subsequently, three other generic companies
challenged Zeneca’s patent; however none were successful, partly
because they could not rely on the prior finding of invalidity. 111 In
2005, consumer groups challenged the validity of the agreement between Zeneca and Barr, alleging that the agreement was illegal because it: (i) allowed the two parties to “resuscitate” a patent that was
held to be invalid and unenforceable; (ii) allowed Zeneca to continue
its monopoly in the tamoxifen market; (iii) allowed the two to share in
the profits of its continued monopoly; (iv) maintained a high price for
the drug; and (v) prevented competition from other generic companies.112 According to the plaintiffs, if the settlement had not occurred,
then Barr would have likely prevailed in the infringement suit and
gained FDA approval to market its generic. 113 FDA approval would
have then triggered the 180-day exclusivity period, ultimately allowing other generics to enter the market years before the patent’s expiration and this earlier market entry would have driven prices below the
levels which existed during the term of agreement. 114
The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling, finding that
the settlement was legal.115 It emphasized the importance of encouraging settlement between parties and explained that a ruling against the
settlement had the potential to chill innovation.116 The court also refused to believe the plaintiffs’ assumption that the invalidity of the
patent would have been affirmed, stating that “[w]e cannot guess with
any degree of assurance what the Federal Circuit would have done on
an appeal from the district court’s judgment in Tamoxifen I.” 117
The court also considered whether excessive payments—those
that exceed the value a generic could have realized if it entered the
market after a successful litigation—were illegal. 118 Unlike other
courts, which only considered whether the payments themselves were
illegal, the Second Circuit went a step further and found that even
110

Id. While at the time considered legal, the Supreme Court has subsequently held that a vacatur like in this case is invalid in nearly all circumstances. See U.S.
Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 27-29 (1994).
111
In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F.3d. at 194-95 (noting challenges from
Novopharm Ltd., Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and Pharmachemie, B.V.).
112
Id. at 196-97.
113
Id. at 197.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 213-16 (discussing how various portions of the settlement agreement
were not unlawful).
116
Id. at 203. If patent law becomes more uncertain, then those willing to
innovate would be less likely to do so out of fear that their investment would not be
rewarded. See id.
117
Id.
118
Id. 208.
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“excessive” payments were “not necessarily unlawful.” 119 It noted that
while it may seem suspicious when a generic manufacturer receives a
windfall payment for not competing, such suspicion is unfounded. 120
So long as the litigation was not meritless or made in bath faith, a
patentee is allowed to protect his patent, even if this means paying a
future competitor to settle an infringement case. 121 The court did not
see the value in setting limits for these payments, since it would inhibit the ability to settle122 and thus, it concluded that the settlement was
not a restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.123
D. In re Ciprofloxacin
The disputed settlement in In re Ciprofloxacin involved Bayer, a
brand-name pharmaceutical company, and Barr, a generic manufacturer. 124 Bayer had a patent for the active ingredient, ciprofloxacin
hydrochloride, in its drug Cipro used to treat bacterial infections,
which was due to expire in 2003. 125 In 2001, Barr filed an ANDA for
its own version of Cipro, including a Paragraph IV certification.126
After receiving notice of Barr’s ANDA, Bayer filed suit, at which
point Barr made a side agreement with HMR to help fund its litigation
costs in exchange for half of any future profits realized from Barr’s
sale of its generic. 127 Prior to trial, the three parties came to an agreement. Barr agreed to change its ANDA from a Paragraph VI to a Paragraph III, thereby certifying that it would not enter the market until
the expiration of Bayer’s patent in exchange for $49.1 million. 128 Additionally, Bayer agreed to pay Barr quarterly payments or supply
Barr with Cipro for resale until the end of 2003 in exchange for Barr
promising not to manufacture its generic version.129
119

Id. at 213.
Id. at 208.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 211 (“Such a rule would…fail to give sufficient consideration to the
patent holder’s incentive to settle the lawsuit without reference to the amount the
generic manufacturer might earn in a competitive market, even when it is relatively
confident of the validity of its patent—to insure against the possibility that its confidence is misplaced….”).
123
Id. at 218.
124
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
125
Id. at 1328.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 1328-29.
129
Id. at 1329 (“Under the…Agreement, Bayer agreed to either supply Barr
with Cipro for resale or to make quarterly payments (referred to as ‘reverse payments’
or ‘exclusion payments’)….”).
120
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Beginning in 2000, purchasers of Cipro and advocacy groups filed
antitrust suits arguing that these agreements were illegal. 130 The district court found that these agreements did not violate the Sherman
Act. 131 Applying the rule of reason test, it determined that ciprofloxacin was the relevant market and that while Bayer did have market
power, the anticompetitive effects of the agreement were within the
scope of its patent; and therefore there could be no unreasonable restraint of trade. 132
On appeal, the Federal Circuit upheld the agreements as legal and
summarized the approaches taken by the Second and Eleventh Circuits, stating that in these types of cases it did not matter whether a
court started by analyzing the issue under antitrust or patent law.133 It
found that, consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence, both the
Second and Eleventh Circuits had recognized that “[t]he essence of
the inquiry [was] whether the agreements restrict competition beyond
the exclusionary zone of the patent.”134 The Federal Circuit agreed
with this approach and also found that the validity of the patent, in the
absence of fraud or sham litigation, need not be considered in order to
assess the need to settle the infringement suit.135
In this case, Bayer simply exercised its right to prevent Barr from
profiting from its patented invention, therefore the settlement did not
run afoul with antitrust laws. The Federal Circuit distinguished In re
Cardizem, where the agreements were found to be per se illegal, because in Cardizem the generic manufacturer did not relinquish its 180day exclusivity period, which completely prevented other generics
from entering the market. 136 In the Federal Circuit’s opinion, this was
a clear example of anti-competitive effects falling outside the scope of

130

Id. The challenges were consolidated in the Eastern District of New York

in 2001.
131

Id. at 1330.
Id.
133
See id. at 1335-36 (In discussing In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.,
466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006) and Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm. Inc., 344 F. 3d
1294 (11th Cir. 2003), the court noted that “in cases…wherein all anticompetitive
effects of the settlement agreement are within the exclusionary power of the patent,
the outcome is the same whether the court begins its analysis under antitrust law…or
under patent law by analyzing the right to exclude afforded by the patent.”).
134
Id. at 1336; see Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem.
Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 175-77 (1965) (recognizing the legal monopoly granted by patents).
135
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride, 544 F.3d at 1336-37.
136
Id. at 1335.
132
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a patent. 137 Bayer’s agreement did not go beyond the scope of its patent and thus the settlement did not violate of the Sherman Act. 138

IV. CURRENT ACADEMIC VIEWS
Today there is a litany of different approaches to the “reverse
payment” dilemma. Some advocate treating these agreements as per
se illegal or, in the alternative, illegal if the settlements greatly exceed
potential litigation costs.139 Conversely, others favor any patent settlement provided that the infringement suit was not filed in bad
faith. 140 In trying to forge a middle ground, some have suggested
creating a rebuttable presumption of illegality while others favor applying the antitrust rule of reason analysis, but with some caveats. 141
Each approach has its downfalls and without a Supreme Court decision or legislative action the debate continues.142
A. Per se Illegal Treatment
In support of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in In re Cardizem, a few
commentators have called for all “reverse payments” to be declared
per se illegal. 143 To allay concerns that this will negatively affect innovation and development of new products in several industries at
least one commentator argues that the ban should only apply to the
pharmaceutical industry. 144 This narrow application would be consistent with the objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act both in benefiting
consumers by facilitating generic entry into the market and in encouraging brand-name drug companies to continue to invest in research
137

Id.
Id. at 1341.
139
See discussion infra Section IV.A.
140
See discussion infra Section IV.B.
141
See discussion infra Section IV.C.
142
See discussion infra Section IV.D. Currently, there is proposed legislation
in Congress, which would make it per se illegal. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 11th Cong. (2009). The Supreme Court, however, has declined the
opportunity to resolve the issue. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056
(11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006).
143
See generally Lisa M. Natter, Note, Infringement Lawsuits: The Continuing Battle Between Patent Law and Antitrust Law in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 18
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 363 (2006); Keith Leffler & Cristofer Leffler, The Probabilistic Nature of Patent Rights: In Response to Kevin McDonald, ANTITRUST, Summer
2003, at 77.
144
Natter, supra note 143, at 381. Natter argues that the per se analysis is
appropriate because: (1) it would apply only to narrow class of cases, (2) it would
resolve unclear law regarding these agreements, and (3) it is consistent with the objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Id.
138
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and new product development.145 Additionally, this rule, while admittedly harsh, would provide clarity to the pharmaceutical industry and
ultimately reduce costs associated with litigation.146 In response to the
reduced innovation argument, one commentator has noted that statistics have shown since the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, both
generic presence in the market and overall investment in research and
development have increased. 147 Thus, because the Act itself has arguably not affected innovation it follows that treating pharmaceutical
agreements as per se illegal would not likely have a great impact since
it would be used in a “limited set of circumstances.” 148
Others have argued for per se illegality because there is rarely a
valid justification for using “reverse payments” to settle infringement
actions. 149 Further, in their opinion, these payments are arguably inefficient because a cross-licensing agreement is often the best method to
approximate the expected conclusion of a patent infringement case,
and also allows for generic entry into the market. 150 This result benefits the consumer as was intended by the Hatch-Waxman Act. However, the idea of limiting parties’ options during litigation, despite
some evidence it may not greatly impact the pharmaceutical industry,
has gained little support with the majority of commentators advocating a different approach. 151
B. Per se Legal Treatment
Per se legal treatment would allow all “reverse payment” settlements so long as the original patent infringement suit was not a
145

See id. at 385-87.
Id. at 384 (arguing that using the rule of reason analysis would increase the
cost of litigation and may not be properly applied since courts have difficulty untangling the complex economic issues presented in antitrust cases).
147
See id. at 386 (indicating that investment in research increased from $2
billion in 1980 to $39 billion in 2004 and generics increased their market share from
19% in 1984 to 57% in 2005) (citation omitted).
148
Id. (“Applying a per se analysis to reverse payment agreements…would
unlikely have anywhere near the impact that the Hatch-Waxman Act had on increasing the percentage of generic drugs in the marketplace. It is therefore difficult to
argue that applying such an analysis in a limited set of circumstances would stifle the
investment and innovation so critical to the pharmaceutical industry.”).
149
See generally Leffler, supra note 143 (providing efficiency arguments to
demonstrate why the per se approach is appropriate for reverse payment settlements
in the pharmaceutical industry).
150
Id. at 79-80.
151
See Ronald W. Davis, Reverse Payment Patent Settlements: A view into
the Abyss, and a Modest Proposal, 21 ANTITRUST, Fall 2006, at 29 (“[T]here is some
support among the commentariat for per se illegality, but not very much.”) (citation
omitted).
146
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sham. 152 Judge Posner articulated this approach in Asashi Glass stating that “unless a neutral observer would reasonably think either that
the patent was almost certain to be declared invalid, or the defendants
were almost certain to be found not to have infringed it, if the suit
went to judgment,” the settlement is legal.153 While in support of this
approach, some commentators recognize that this standard is potentially underinclusive by preventing only the worst abusive settlements. 154 For instance, it could “allow[] the patent owner to preserve
its economic position, possibly for the entire life of the patent, even if
its chances of prevailing in litigation are substantially less than 50
percent, as long as the suit is not objectively baseless.” 155 However,
because they fear that an overinclusive standard would negatively
affect settlements and that having no recognized standard would only
create more uncertainty, the per se legal approach is the best solution
available.156 Another supporter of this approach argues that “reverse
payment” agreements are not themselves anticompetitive because this
type of payment structure is often necessary to settle these disputes,
and may ultimately benefit the consumer by facilitating generic entry
onto the market. 157 Despite these arguments in favor of the per se legal approach, most propose an approach that attempts to balance consumer interest and antitrust goals, while recognizing the rights granted
by a patent. 158

152
See Kent S. Barnard & Willard Tom, Antitrust Treatment of Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Need for Context and Fidelity to First Principles, 15 FED.
CIR. B.J. 617, 632 (2006) (proposing per se legal approach to reverse payment settlements as long as the agreement is not a “sham settlement”); see also Davis, supra
note 151, at 28 (noting that the per se legal approach has “scant” support among
commentators).
153
Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 993 (N.D.
Ill. 2003). Judge Posner did not consider whether this standard applied to the “reverse
payment” situation because that issue was not before him. However, some commentators argue that its logic is appropriate in these scenarios. See Barnard & Tom, supra
note 152, at 633.
154
See Barnard & Tom, supra note 152, at 633.
155
Id.
156
Id. (“We are better off with a standard that is occasionally underinclusive
than we are with the chilling effect on patent settlements that comes with either an
overinclusive standard or the uncertainty bred by the search for a perfect standard.”).
157
See Marc G. Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse
Payment Fallacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1033, 1034 (2004) (arguing that instead of continued litigation, which is no benefit to the consumer, settlements that split the life of
the patent allow generics to enter the market prior to the patent’s expiration, which
ultimately favors the consumer).
158
See discussion infra Section IV.C.
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C. Compromise Between the Two Extremes: The Middle Ground
To avoid the over- and underinclusiveness inherent in the per se
approaches, many commentators seek a middle ground that requires a
more nuanced analysis of patent settlements and the goals of antitrust. 159 Some argue for a rebuttable presumption of illegality, where
the settling parties have the burden of showing that these agreements
do not violate antitrust law since they are in the best position to demonstrate that such payments were reasonable. 160 Each commentator,
however, proffers his own unique set of factors that can overcome the
presumption of illegality. For example, some suggest that the payment
size must be limited to “no more than the expected value of litigation
and collateral costs attending the lawsuit,” in order to be considered
reasonable. 161 The reasoning is that if a patent holder truly believed it
would prevail in its patent infringement case, it would pay no more
than the expected cost of litigation to settle.162 If the payment exceeds
this expectation, the patent holder must have doubts about its patent
validity or the “defendant’s status as an infringer,”163 therefore the
payment reflects a socially costly outcome, allowing the patent holder
to preserve its monopoly even though the patent is probably invalid
while denying the consumer the benefit of competition. 164
One commentator warns against a ceiling on acceptable payments,
voicing concern over a rule which forces parties “into alternative settlement arrangements [that] might, in some cases, materially affect
patent owners’ ex ante incentives by reducing the expected payoff

159

See generally Scott A. Backus, Reversing Course on Reverse Payment
Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Has Schering-plough Created the Blueprint for Defensible Antitrust Violations? 60 OKLA. L. REV. 375, 410-11 (2007) (discussing the different positions in the middle ground approach to reverse payments).
160
See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1759
(2003) (arguing that the infringement plaintiff should bear the burden of demonstrating that the payment was reasonable); Thomas Cotter, Antitrust Implications of a
Patent Settlements Involving Reverse Payments: Defending a Rebuttable Presumption
of Illegality in Light of Some Recent Scholarships, 71 ANTITRUST L. J. 1069, 1082
(2004) (arguing that the settling parties should bear the burden of persuasion on
whether the settlement was lawful); Carrier, supra note 24, at 76 (arguing that the
settling parties should have the opportunity to rebut the presumption of illegality).
161
Hovenkamp et al., supra note 160, at 1759 (footnote omitted).
162
See id. at 1759 n. 177.
163
Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 25
164
Id.; see also Backus, supra note 159, at 405 (explaining the consumer
harm from these payments is the difference between what the consumer would gain if
the patent infringement case was decided and what the consumer receives as a result
of settlement).
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from invention.” 165 Another argues that there should not be a particular method of demonstrating the reasonableness of the payment, and
instead suggests that the defendants can explain their payments several ways, including that: (1) the generic was cash-strapped; (2) the generic and the brand-name had “informational asymmetries” about the
patent; (3) the payment was not larger than litigation costs; (4) other
reasonable explanations (i.e., reliance on sales projects, market analyses). 166
Ultimately, the aim of these propositions is to bridge the divide
between courts and commentators, however to achieve this compromise, courts would face greater “administrative costs and decreased
efficiency due to the requirement for a more thorough investigation of
the settlement agreement and the underlying patent infringement
claim.” 167 With each new proposal, the search continues for a perfect
solution that properly balances the Hatch-Waxman Act’s goal of increasing generic competition, the exclusionary power granted by a
patent, and antitrust principles, in the hopes of obtaining the best outcome for consumers and the pharmaceutical industry. Yet, this debate
could be avoided if the FTC, in addition to bringing suit against
pharmaceutical companies for antitrust violations, could attack the
underlying patent to ensure the settlement was based on a valid patent.

V. THE FTC SHOULD CHALLENGE THE
UNDERLYING PATENT’S VALIDITY TO ENFORCE
THE PUBLIC’S INTEREST IN FREE COMPETITION
In the past, the FTC has only challenged the settlements between
pharmaceutical companies based on allegations of antitrust violations. 168 Yet considering the ruling in United States v. U.S. Gypsum
Co. and United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., the FTC has standing to
challenge the underlying patents involved in these antitrust disputes. 169 This would ensure that there would always be at least one
party who has the ability to challenge the patent and cannot be silenced through payment.
A. The Government has Standing to Challenge a Patent’s Validity
The concept that the Government itself could have standing in a
patent validity case was first litigated in United States v. American
165
166
167
168
169

Cotter, supra note 160, at 1092.
Carrier, supra note 24, at 76.
Backus, supra note 159, at 411 (footnotes omitted).
See discussion supra Section III.
See discussion infra Section V.A.
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Bell Telephone Co.170 The Government argued that Bell Telephone
fraudulently delayed its application in order to extend its monopoly on
a product that was already in the public domain, or in the alternative,
that it was not the original inventor and thus, the court should invalidate the patent. 171 Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that the delay
was not due to the applicant but rather the patent office itself, so there
was no fraud on part of Bell Telephone. 172 The Court did not consider
the second argument regarding the validity of the patent because it
ruled that the Government lacked standing to make such a claim. 173
The Government is not required to abide by the standing requirements that apply to private patent suits “when it has a proprietary and
pecuniary interest in the result” and “when it is necessary in order to
enable it to discharge its obligations to the public.” 174 Yet in Bell Telephone, no such interest existed. 175 Instead the Court found that the
Government was “a mere formal complainant in a suit, not for the
purpose of asserting any public right or protecting any public interest,
title, or property, but merely to form a conduit through which one
private person can conduct litigation against another private person….” 176 The Government was thereby bound to “the rules governing…suits between private litigants,” 177 which at the time meant that
only a party charged with infringement could challenge the validity of
the patent. 178 However, the Court explained that the Government
might have such an interest when prosecuting antitrust violations.179 It
noted that one of the responsibilities of government is to ensure that
the public does not endure the evils of a monopoly, especially one
“wrongfully created” through an invalid patent. The Court refused to
decide whether this was enough to exempt the Government from the
standing rules applied in private litigation.180 It concluded that reviewing simple errors committed by the patent office was inappropriate
and would allow courts to have appellate jurisdiction over the organi-
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zation, which was never authorized or intended by Congress. 181 Thus,
the Government had no standing to argue the invalidity of the patent.
In United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., the Supreme Court was
asked to decide the question it had previously declined to address in
United States v. Bell Telephone Co.—whether the government was
allowed to challenge a patent when the patent holder was accused of
violating antitrust law. 182 In Gypsum, the Government brought suit
against U.S. Gypsum Company and others, arguing the companies
had an illegal conspiracy to monopolize trade in gypsum products
because of various agreements to fix prices on the patented gypsum
board and unpatented gypsum products.183 After the defendants admitted that the arrangements would be illegal if they did not have a patent, the Government tried to amend their claim to dispute the patent’s
validity. 184 The lower court did not allow this amendment, ruling the
Government lacked the standing to challenge the patent.185
The Supreme Court, however, overruled the decision, stating that
the Government did have standing to challenge the validity of the
patents. 186 Although the Court thought that it was clear that the
agreements went beyond the scope of the patent and therefore the
Government’s failed amendment was not dispositive, the Court felt it
necessary to directly overrule the lower court’s decision concerning
standing. 187 Since a licensee in an antitrust suit can challenge the validity a patent because of a “public interest in free competition” and
the Government has the same interest to preserve competition, the
Court decided that the Government should have the same right to
challenge a patent’s validity as well.188
The Court further expanded the Government’s ability to challenge
a patent in United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd. decision. 189 In Glaxo,
two companies decided to pool their various patents concerning the
antibiotic giriseofulvin, which is used to treat external fungal infections. 190 They agreed not to sell the product without consent and then
made various licensing agreements that restricted the resale of the
181
Id. at 269 (“That would be an attempt on the part of the courts in collateral
attack to exercise an appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the patent office,
although no appellate jurisdiction has been…conferred.”).
182
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Id. at 387-88.
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United States v. Glaxo Grp., Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973).
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Id. at 53.
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drug as well. 191 The Government alleged these restrictions on drug
sale and resales were in violation of the Sherman Act.192 The Government also challenged the validity one of the patents, but the district
court struck this argument because the companies did not use the patents and the legal monopoly granted by them to defend the agreements. 193 Even though the district court held that the agreements were
illegal, the Government still appealed because it was denied the relief
it requested.194
In its decision, the Supreme Court ruled the Government could
challenge a patent’s validity even when the patent was not part of a
defense. 195 However, in Glaxo, it was necessary to decide the validity
of the patent in order to decide whether the Government’s request for
compulsory licensing and mandatory sales was appropriate.196 Therefore, the Court noted:
we do not recognize unlimited authority in the Government to
attack a patent by basing an antitrust claim on the simple assertion that the patent is invalid. Nor do we invest the Attorney General with a roving commission to question the validity
of any patent lurking in the background of an antitrust case.197
This restriction prevents the Government attacking any patent involved in an antitrust litigation, limiting their challenges to the patent,
and in particular, the patent’s claims that directly concern the antitrust
violations. 198 Yet, if the antitrust violation is “sufficiently related” to
the patent, then the Government has the ability to challenge its validity. 199
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Id. at 54-55.
Id. at 56 (noting that the district court held that the agreements to be a per
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B. The FTC Can Challenge the Patent in Pharmaceutical Antitrust
Cases Because the Pharmaceutical Companies Rely on Their Patents
to Justify Their Conduct
While Gypsum and Glaxo were cases prosecuted by the DOJ, this
should not impact whether the precedent can be extended to suits
brought by the FTC. Gypsum and Glaxo clearly established that when
a company relies upon its patents to justify its anticompetitive behavior, the United States is allowed to question the validity of these patents.200 In pharmaceutical patent settlements, companies are clearly
relying on their patents to defend their conduct. Thus, the government
agency tasked with investigating these settlements and preventing
unfair competition should be able to question the validity of these
patents in order to protect consumers from unjust monopolies.
The FTC has authority under the Federal Trade Commission Act
(FTC Act) to prevent companies from engaging in “unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.” 201 The Supreme Court has interpreted the unfairness standard as “encompassing not only practices
that violate the Sherman Act and other antitrust laws, but also practices that the Commission determines are against public policy for other
reasons.” 202 The only limitation to this broad standard is that once the
Commission concludes a business practice violates one of these rationales, “administrative law dictate[s] that its decision must stand or fall
on that basis, and a reviewing court may not consider other reasons
why the practice might be deemed unfair.” 203
When the FTC challenges “reverse payment” settlements, it has
always argued that the settlements violate antitrust law, and thus violate the FTC Act. 204 Since the FTC is challenging these agreements
under antitrust law governed by the Sherman Act and forcing the defendants to justify their anticompetitive behavior, if the defendant tries
to defend its actions by invoking its patent rights, then FTC should
have the opportunity to “show that the asserted shield of patentability
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does not exist,” 205 as discussed in Gypsum. Courts have recognized
this reliance on patents to defend anticompetitive behavior stating,
“the right of exclusion conferred by a patent has been characterized as
a defense to an antitrust claim.” 206 Gypsum clearly stated that when a
company relies upon its patents to justify its anticompetitive behavior,
the Government is allowed to attack the validity of the patents in the
name of public interest in free competition.207 Companies themselves
have argued that the FTC needs to consider the exclusionary power
and not rely solely on the existence and size of the payment when
arguing against these payments. 208 If these pharmaceutical companies
wish to defend their behavior solely on the principle that their patents
grant them the power to exclude, the FTC, as the Government’s representative and consumer advocate in these cases, should be able to
question the validity of the relevant pharmaceutical patent.
The ability to question the underlying patent in these settlements
would transform the FTC’s approach in prosecuting “reverse payment” settlements. If the pharmaceutical companies were required to
justify their agreements by demonstrating that they were founded on
valid patents, then the public would be protected from abusive agreements. If the FTC adopted this strategy, it would increase the time and
resources required to pursue these claims. However, if pharmaceutical
companies are aware of the risk involved in structuring settlements
that include “reverse payments,” it is likely that the number of these
settlements will decrease to avoid the scrutiny of the FTC, ultimately
reducing the expected burden on the agency. While it has been argued
this type of payment is a necessary option for companies to consider
when creating these settlements, this approach could effectively eliminate this as an option. 209 Additionally, it is worth noting that because
the pharmaceutical companies have been required to file settlement
agreements with the FTC and DOJ, the vast majority of these settlements have not included “reverse payments” to generics. 210 This settlement structure is not the only option available to pharmaceutical
companies. Although this approach may be seen as a way to under205
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mine the rights granted to a patentee, Congress has recognized the
public interest in ensuring that only valid patents are issued by stating
“an issued patent carries only a rebuttable presumption of validity,
which can be challenged in court.” 211 If the patentee can effectively
silence any of its potential competitors, the public would be forced to
endure unwarranted patent monopolies. This approach would not be
undermining the rights granted to the patentee but rather ensuring that
these rights were properly granted in the first place.
C. Lear Supports the Conclusion that the FTC Can Challenge the Patent’s Validity
In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, the Supreme Court recognized that there
are few parties truly capable of challenging a patent and explained the
negative consequences that would result if these parties were unable
to do so. 212 The Court was asked to reconsider whether a licensee was
able to challenge the validity of the licensor’s patent. 213 Previously,
the Court had held under the principle of estoppel that a licensee was
unable to challenge a patent because as a licensee it would be unfair to
reap the rewards of a licensed patent but also challenge it. 214 In deciding to overrule itself and allow a licensee to challenge a patent’s validity, the Court considered who really has the ability to make such a
challenge: “[l]icensees may often be the only individuals with enough
economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an inventor’s
discovery. If they are muzzled, the public may continually be required
to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need or justification.” 215
The courts today need to revisit Lear’s public policy argument
and apply it in the context of pharmaceutical settlements, remembering who is best able to act as a guardian of the public interest. Often
times only generic drug companies are in the position to challenge a
brand-name’s patent and when brand-names are able to negotiate generics’ silence, who is left to make sure we, the public, are not required to pay “would-be monopolists” for patents that may or may not
be valid? Considering the FTC is the government agency tasked to
211
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protect consumers from anticompetitive behavior, courts should have
no issue allowing the FTC to challenge the validity of the patents involved in “reverse payment” settlements because without their help,
the public may continue to suffer the high cost of brand-name drugs
without justification.

V. CONCLUSION
Allowing the FTC to challenge the underlying patents completely
changes the FTC’s ability to attack “reverse payment” agreements.
While the FTC still needs sufficient evidence to allege an antitrust
violation in order to shift the burden to the defendants to explain their
conduct, the FTC can simultaneously question the validity of the patent if the defendants choose to hide behind the exclusionary power of
their patents. This approach would allow the FTC to effectively advocate the public’s interest in free competition by ensuring these agreements are founded on valid patents. Without FTC action against
pharmaceutical patent settlements, the public will be forced to continue paying higher medical expenses without proper justification.
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COLLATERAL DAMAGE: INSECURITY
ASSETS IN THE RISING VIRTUAL AGE
OF E-COMMERCE
INTRODUCTION
Virtual worlds are computer-based, simulated environments that
incorporate real-world representations of objects into an interface
where users can interact with one another, typically through the use of
an “avatar” 1 that is graphically visible to other users.2 Virtual worlds
are “persistent and dynamic” because they exist independent of users’
home computers and constantly change even when users are offline.3
At the forefront of innovative virtual realities is the online application
Second Life, developed by Linden Labs and launched on June 23,
2003. In Second Life, a resident assumes the role of an avatar in a
virtual world where he can personalize his appearance, own property
and real estate, shop in a virtual economy, operate a storefront, socialize with other players, and acquire numerous forms of virtual, intangible property that has real value. 4 To buy land and items in Second
Life, players can acquire “Lindens,” Second Life’s currency, with
U.S. dollars. 5 Second Life, unlike its predecessors, is a “non-scripted”
world in which users design content and transform the virtual world
1

An “avatar” is defined as: “An on-line, real-time graphical representation
of an interactive computer service user visible to other users accessing (or sharing)
the same virtual three-dimensional world. Depending on its implementation, an Avatar may communicate by a combination of body movements (such as walking, gesturing and making facial expressions), text and speech, all of which may be seen and
heard by other occupants of the virtual world. Avatars may grasp, possess and exchange objects with other Avatars and entities within the virtual world.” Steven
Hetcher, Virtual China, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 469, 473 n. 21 (2008)
(quoting 2 RICHARD RAYSMAN ET AL., EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES & THE LAW: FORMS
& ANALYSIS APP. E. (2008)).
2
Ned Kock, E-Collaboration and E-Commerce in Virtual Worlds: The
Potential of Second Life and World of Warcraft, 4 INT’L J. E-COLLABORATION, Jul.Sept. 2008, at 1 (discussing the emergence of virtual worlds used for entertainment
and business purposes).
3
Juliet M. Moringiello, What Virtual Worlds Can Do for Property Law, 62
FLA. L. REV. 159, 169 (2010) [hereinafter Moringiello, Virtual Worlds].
4
What is Second Life?, SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/whatis
(last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
5
Id.
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